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WE LOST IT AT THE MOVIES:
THE RULE OF LAW GOES FROM
WASHINGTON TO HOLLYWOOD
AND BACK AGAIN
Susan Bandes*
People don't understand what happens to you when you become a
judge. When you take that judicial oath, you are transformed. You
become a different person. You have a solemn obligation to be totally
impartial and fair.
Third Circuit Judge Edward Becker, testifying at Judge Samuel
Alito's Senate confirmation hearing for Supreme Court Justice.
Essentially, Roy Bean goes way beyond being a Dirty Harry on the
range, because there is no rational order to keep in Roy Bean's world;
we're supposed to laugh in agreement when he takes a lawbook and
tears out the page that doesn't suit his purposes .... He is the law, and
there is no other, except for fools and weaklings who are "taken in."
- Pauline Kael, reviewing The Life and Times of Judge Roy Bean
Politicians pretend that there is a plausible jurisprudence that would not
require judges to make their own value judgments. But they are simply
wrong; there is no such jurisprudence. Value-free adjudication is not an
option.
- Jeremy Waldron, reviewing Ronald Dworkin's Justice in Robes

During the Senate confirmation hearings on Judge Samuel
Alito's nomination to the United States Supreme Court, some
senators voiced concerns about memoranda Alito had written while
in practice arguing that Roe v. Wade1 should be overturned.' Judge
* Susan Bandes is Distinguished Research Professor at DePaul University College of Law.
The author wishes to thank John Nockleby and the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for
organizing this fascinating symposium, Lawrence Friedman, Joe Rollins and Carol Sanger for
incisive commentary on an earlier draft of this article, Daniel Bond of the DePaul Class of 2007
for excellent research assistance, and law librarian Mark Giangrande for his creative and
invaluable help.
1. Roev. Wade. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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Edward Becker assured the Senate that although Alito had at one
time passionately advocated overturning Roe v. Wade, his ascension
to the bench3 had transformed him into a different person, and that
this person would leave all such passions behind." Alito himself
agreed that his prior judicial philosophy was irrelevant to his conduct
in future cases, stating that "[t]he judge's only obligation... is to the
rule of law, [which means that] in every single case, the judge has to
do what the law requires." 5
During the hearings on Judge John Roberts' nomination to the
position of Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
Roberts similarly endorsed this entrenched notion of the judge as
faceless conduit for the rule of law-and of the rule of law itself as a
fixed and determinate set of rules. Invoking a well-known baseball
analogy, he explained, "Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't
make the rules, they apply them .... They make sure everybody
plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball
game to see the umpire." 6
And, with rare exceptions, nobody ever went to a courtroom
drama to see the judge. Judges in film and television-if they are
acting "appropriately judicial"-are barely noticeable at all.7 That is,
they are playing the role that Judge Becker, Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justice Alito evoked in their confirmation testimony: the person
who leaves all his prior attitudes behind and is transformed into a
computer in robes-discerning the right and wrong of the situation
and simply applying the law that is "out there," and that admits to
only one possible outcome. The problem is that this depiction of the
2. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 27 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation Hearing] (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
3. Judge Alito was appointed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in April 1990 and
remained there until his appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court in January 2006. See Auto
ConfirmationHearing,supra note 2, at 51 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).
4. See id. at 655-56 (statement of Edward R. Becker, Senior J., U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit).
5. Id. at 56 (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.).
6. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter
Roberts Confirmation Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.); see also Jan Crawford
Greenburg, Roberts Testifies, 'I Have No Agenda': Democrats Zero in on Civil Rights, Privacy,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 13, 2005, § 1, at 1; David G. Savage, Roberts Sees Role as Judicial 'Umpire,'
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at Al.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 25-32.
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judicial role is not just an artifact of the big and small screen.
Members of the lay public-a majority of them, according to a recent
survey-are upset about what they perceive to be activist judges.8
They, too, apparently believe that judges are like umpires.9
More surprising, or more disheartening, is the fact that pledging
fealty to this same view of the judicial role remains de rigueur in the
halls of Congress. In this venue, too, the fiction is maintained that
the relationship between judge and law ought to be automatic,
formulaic, and uninteresting. There is, then, a vast gap between
public discourse and imagery on the judicial role and the discourse in
the legal community, which regards as uncontroversial the
proposition that "a judge's choice of methodologies and ...exercise

of

discretion

are

imbued

with

an

inescapably

political

dimension. . . ."" This Article explores the connection between the

depiction of the judicial role in cultural artifacts like movies and
television shows and the very similar caricature of the judicial role
that still holds sway in more serious non-fiction venues like Senate
confirmation hearings and political campaigns.
This Article will posit the proposition that a feedback loop exists
between law and popular culture, and that this loop has consequences
for the shape of the legal system. It will explore the judicial role in
popular culture, in which the judge is generally depicted either as a
neutral or invisible placeholder for the rule of law or as biased,
vulgar, or downright villainous.
Drawing from legal theory,
narrative theory, psychology, and prior work on popular culture and
media studies, it will argue that the simplistic and prevailing notion
8. Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees 'JudicialActivism Crisis': ABA Journal Survey Results
Surprise Some Legal Experts, A.B.A. J. EREP. Sept. 30, 2005, at 1, http://www.abanet.org/
journal/redesign/s30survey.htmil.
9. Id. Ironically, as one umpire has pointed out in an op-ed piece in The New York Times,
umpires are actually more like judges. See Robert Schwartz, Op-Ed., Like They See 'Em, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A37. Umpires have to interpret the rules in ambiguous circumstances;
they "often have no choice but to use discretion;" and they may do so within varying interpretive
frameworks. Id. According to the author, some are "pitchers' umpires," some are "praised by
batters," and some have no strike zone, but take a case-by-case approach-itself a methodology.
Id.; see also Joseph Thai, A Wild Pitch on Eavesdropping, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2006, at A9;
Posting of Jim Lindgren to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/
archive_2005_09_ 1-2005_0917.shtml# 1126558476 (Sept. 12, 2005, 16:54 EST) (quoting Hall
of Fame umpire Bill Klem's comment about whether a pitch was a ball or a strike: "It ain't
nothin' till I call it.").
10. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
InstitutionalizingJudicialRestraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974 (2002).
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of judges and judging that currently dominates the discourse is
inherently conservative and hegemonic. The Article concludes that
this state of affairs is not simply familiar and comforting, but
detrimental to the rule of law and the evolution of the judicial
system.
I. THE POPULAR CULTURE FEEDBACK Loop

Popular interest in the judicial role spikes occasionally, either
because of a particular issue that arouses passion or because of a high
profile judicial vacancy, usually a vacancy on the Supreme Court.
The last several years have been such a time: the Supreme Court
decided a brutally close presidential election," a lower federal court
ordered Terri Schiavo disconnected from a feeding tube, 2 and after
heated controversy and a few false starts, two vacancies on the
Supreme Court were filled. 3 These and other events have fueled an
ongoing national conversation about the judicial role, one notable for
its intensity and polarization. In this conversation, the stark choice
between two unrealistic options-the judge as neutral conduit or
umpire and the judge as ideologically driven political activist-was a
disturbingly dominant mode of argument. The argument has
generated much heat, if not much light: those who believe that judges
have devolved into "just another interest group"'4 have advocated a
number of measures, some quite draconian, designed to keep judges
out of the political arena. 5 Charles Geyh notes, for example, that
after the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the order permitting removal of
Terri Schiavo's feeding tube, 6
[c]onservative Republican[s] ... offered a rainbow of
proposals to curb the courts: impeach the miscreants; strip

11. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
12. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
13. See Press Release, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/pr_-09-29-05.html; Press Release, Supreme Court of the
U.S. (Jan. 31, 2006), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/pr_01-31-06.html.
14. Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Interbranch
Relations 13 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No.
06-29, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=922091.
15. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing JudicialAccountabilityfrom the Realm of Political
Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911 (2006).
16. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), aJg 357 F.
Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
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their jurisdiction; slash their budgets, disestablish their
offices; and deprive Democrats of the power to filibuster
nominees of a President committed to appointing "common
who understand that our rights are derived
sense judges
17
from God.'

In short, when certain judicial philosophies (or judges with certain
backgrounds) are portrayed as the norm and others as deviations
from the norm, these portrayals shape perceptions, and these
perceptions have consequences. Popular culture both fuels and is
fueled by these perceptions, and thus needs to be taken seriously.
And how do certain ideologies come to be viewed as neutral,
natural, invisible, non-ideological? How do judicial philosophies
that do not fit a particular mold come to be viewed as deviant,
suspect, inappropriately political? Popular culture 8 plays an important role in this process. For many, popular culture is the primary
source of information about the legal system. 9 As Richard Sherwin
explains:
Culture provides the signs, images, stories, characters,
metaphors, and scenarios, among other familiar materials,
with which we make sense of our lives and the world
around us. Being part of a community means that we
perceive or interpret events in overlapping ways using
shared cognitive and cultural tools and materials. Law is
such a community, with its own materials and preferred
tools of analysis, its own practices and habits of mind. But
it is also the case that law's stories and images and
characters leach back into the culture at large. In this way,
law is a co-producer of popular culture.2"

17. Geyh, supra note 15.
18. There is debate about the precise meaning of the term "popular culture." One definition
is the 'beliefs, practices and wisdom of ordinary people ...[which] tend[] to crystallize most
commonly in print media, popular music, film and television'." Stuart Weinstein, Repressed
Memory Revisited: PopularCulture's Impact on the Law-PsychotherapyDebate, in 7 LAW AND
POPULAR CULTURE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2004 at 404, 406 (Michael Freeman ed., 2005)
(quoting MARGARET

THORNTON,

ROMANCING

THE TOMES: POPULAR CULTURE, LAW AND

FEMINISM 6 (2002)).

19. Naomi Mezey & Mark C. Niles, Screening the Law: Ideology and Law in American
PopularCulture, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91, 95 (2005); Burbank, supra note 14, at 8.
20.

RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW

AND POPULAR CULTURE 5 (2000).
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Popular culture helps people make sense of the world by making
"certain ways of thinking and acting and being seem utterly normal
and natural."'2' This is not to suggest either that popular culture is a
monolithic entity or that it necessarily imposes a monolithic view of
law. Nevertheless, from the cacophony of media images, there tends
to emerge a universe of acceptable, familiar-seeming imagesstories and characters which we imbibe, interpret, and at least
partially incorporate into our worldview.
These understandings and images become part of a feedback
loop. Popular notions of what law is and ought to be, in turn,
"contribute[] to the production of law" 22 in manifold ways. Popular
notions of how a judge looks and acts and sounds--of what counts as
judicial temperament or sound judging-will affect not only those
who find themselves in the courtroom as litigants, witnesses, or
jurors, but also those who vote in judicial elections, those who debate
judicial qualifications, and those who follow or are affected by
judicial decisions. Popular notions of judges and judging are part
and parcel of evolving notions of judicial power and legitimacy.
They will affect, for good or ill, who becomes a judge, who stays a
judge, and the allowable scope of judicial power. They will affect
the way judges conduct themselves on the bench and, in ways both
salutary and unfortunate, the reception and even the content of their
21
opinions.
II. THE INVISIBLE ICON
The phrase "the rule of law" exerts a strong hold on the popular
imagination. It promises integrity, clarity, transparency, and due
process. It is often said that the rule of law demands a government
of law, not of men. The popular understanding of the judicial role
constitutes a literal reading of this aphorism. In the popular
imagination, the upright judge is not a person with characteristics
21. Mezey & Niles, supra note 19, at 108.
22. SHERWIN, supra note 20, at 18.
23. Professor Burbank argues that it is legitimate and inevitable for courts of last resort "to
take account of considerations that bear on the perceived legitimacy and continuing effectiveness
of the judiciary as a whole." Burbank, supra note 14, at 15. He distinguishes situations in which
courts evade results that are required by positive law, which he calls "political" in a way "difficult
to distinguish from the behavior of an elected politician," from situations in which there is room
for discretion, and judges consider the consequences of their decisions for the continuing ability
of the court to function properly. Id.
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and values, but simply a placeholder for the rule of law. He is
justice, and not only is he blind, but, like the child covering his eyes
in a game of hide and seek, he is also invisible (or so we like to
think). Just as his blindfold prevents him from "being swayed by
visual recognition,' 24 he himself is allowed few recognizable
characteristics that would distinguish him from other judges. If he
does have "character," this is likely an indication that he is at best
temperamentally unsuited for the job, and at worst incompetent,
biased, or a criminal.
The traditional portrayal of the judge in American popular
culture, as David Papke observes, has been as a flat rather than round
character: an easily recognizable, stock character who "lacked
individualizing detail and was also static. ' 25 The default figure of a
judge is a middle-aged white male 26 like the judge in To Kill a
Mockingbird,27 who occupies space in the galvanizing courtroom
scenes but does nothing to advance the plot, or the judge in 12 Angry
Men,25 who is portrayed as "almost secondary or peripheral."2 9 If he
has any character at all, he is wise and fatherly-in the 1950's
Father Knows Best"0 omniscient tradition.
He does not play
favorites, and he does not bring preconceived notions-or any
emotions-to the bench. Like the judge in My Cousin Vinny,3 he
might be a stickler for procedure and decorum, but he has little to say
about substance. In the simplified pop culture lexicon, the portrayal
of his lack of favoritism and preconceptions is, at the same time, a
portrayal of a de-contextualized cipher-a man without opinions,
values, politics, or even a life outside the bench. Indeed, he is the

24.

ANTHONY CHASE, MOVIES ON TRIAL: THE LEGAL SYSTEM ON THE SILVER SCREEN 13

(2002).
25. David Ray Papke, From Flat to Round: Changing Portrayalsof the Judge in American
Popular Culture 7 (Marquette Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
06-24, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=902125.
26. As one author points out, there have recently been a number of "African American actors
playing tough, folksy judges." ROSS D. LEVI, THE CELLULOID COURTROOM: A HISTORY OF
LEGAL CINEMA 50 (2005). Levi mentions, for example, Ossie Davis in The Client, Paul Winfield
in Presumed Innocent, and Danny Glover in The Rainmaker. Id. at 48-50.
27. To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Pictures et al. 1962).
28. 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957).
29. STEVE GREENFIELD, GUY OSBORN & PETER ROBSON, FILM AND THE LAW 143 (2001).
30. FatherKnows Best (CBS television broadcast 1954-1963).
31. MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox et al. 1992).
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bench-a piece of furniture: immovable, fungible, and standardissue. Or, as Judge Posner once complained, he is a potted plant. 2
In American popular culture, most legal action takes place
during dramatic criminal trials.33 To be sure, there is a small canon
of films about civil law, and particularly tort law, though these too
are trial films.3 4 Trial films are an especially difficult venue in which
to raise questions about law, politics, and interpretation because most
of the questions they portray are factual and evidentiary in nature.
"[T]he trial film's finale is often an unsophisticated revelation of
some hidden essential truth-be it the facts of the case or the law's
inability to assess those facts fairly."35
These films miss a host of opportunities to explore the role of
politics in judging. For example, films about state trial courts, in
which judges are often elected, elide distinctions between the
partisan politics that put certain judges on the bench and keep them
there and the political considerations-both high and low-that
affect their allegiances and their rulings once on the bench.36 Such
films could include portrayals not only of judges beholden to those
who appoint them,37 but also of judges whose background38 and
values affect their sympathies, consciously or unconsciously.39 The

32. Richard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?,THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at
23-25.
33. See Stefan Machura & Stefan Ulbrich, Law in Film: Globalizing the Hollywood
Courtroom Drama, 28 J.L. & Soc'Y 117, 118 (2001) (noting the extent to which American
adversary procedure dominates film and suggesting that the judge in Germany would play a
different, stronger role); see also Stefan Machura, Procedural Unfairness in Real and Film
Trials: Why Do Audiences UnderstandStories Placedin Foreign Legal Systems?, in 7 LAW AND
POPULAR CULTURE, supra note 18, at 148.
34. CHASE, supra note 24, at 104-19.
35. Jessica Silbey, Patternsof CourtroomJustice, 28 J.L. & SOC'Y 97, 111 (2001).
36. For a discussion of some of these influences, see Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice:
Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1322-24 (1999) [hereinafter Bandes,
Patterns ofInjustice].
37. As one discussion of judges in film points out, AMISTAD (DreamWorks SKG et al. 1997)
portrays a judge who is chosen for political reasons under the assumption that he will be
sympathetic to the government position, but who displays unexpected independence.
GREENFIELD, OSBORN & ROBSON, supra note 29, at 148.
38. In MUSIC BOX (Carolco Pictures 1989), the lawyers speculate that the Jewish judge's
background might affect him in a trial involving Nazi war crimes, but this turns out to be a nonissue. LEVI, supra note 26, at 47.
39. See, for example, the portrait of Judge Locallo in STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A
YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE (2005). See also Bandes,
Patterns ofInjustice, supra note 36, at 1321 & n.289 (discussing state court judges who are often
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portrayal of the judge in A Civil Action, 40 not corrupt but certainly
cozy with business, gives a glimmer of how this might be done.4 '
Exploring such issues would require acknowledgment of race, class,
and ethnicity. It would require recognizing the possibility of an
empathetic divide between some judges and some litigants. Media's
homogenizing process, 4 2 however, insures that this rarely occurs.

Instead, judges who deviate from the role of invisible icon or wise
father do so in ways that are not understandable, not contextualized,
but simply wrongheaded. They tend to be partisan bullies like the
judge in The Verdict;43 racists like the judge in Mississippi Burning;44
45 or downright criminal,
corrupt like the judge in The Untouchables;
like the blackmailing judge in Advise & Consent,46 the rapist judge
in... And Justice for All,47 or the murdering vigilante judges in
Judge Dredd and The Star Chamber.49 Or sometimes they tend to

be comedic partisan bullies like the "doddering old fools" who often
preside in the Rumpole stories."
Although for reasons of both space and expertise, I cannot give
the daytime courtroom dramas the attention they deserve,5 a couple
of observations on that genre are in order As Steven Kohm points

former prosecutors or law enforcement officials, and their attitudes toward allegations that
Chicago police had been torturing black male suspects).
40. A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone Pictures et al. 1998).
41. As Anthony Chase points out, some aspects of the film's unusual approach may be a
function of the fact that the film was based on a non-fictional work. See CHASE, supra note 24, at
113-16.
42. JEFFREY SCHEUER, THE SOUND BITE SOCIETY: TELEVISION AND THE AMERICAN MIND
36-37 (1999).
43. THE VERDICT (20th Century Fox 1982); see also Papke, supra note 25, at 20; Silbey,
supra note 35, at 107-11.
44. MISSISSIPPI BURNING (Orion Pictures 1988).
45. THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount Pictures 1987).
46. ADVISE & CONSENT (Otto Preminger Films 1962).
47. . .. AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (Columbia Pictures 1979).
48. JUDGE DREDD (Hollywood Pictures 1995).
49. THE STAR CHAMBER (20th Century Fox et al. 1983).
50. GREENFIELD, OSBORN & ROBSON, supra note 29, at 147 (discussing the comic judge,
particularly those in the British comic tradition).
51. Happily, others have done so. See, e.g., Steven A. Kohm, The People's Law versus
Judge Judy Justice: Two Models of Law in American Reality-Based Courtroom TV, 40 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 693 (2006); Papke, supra note 25, at 29-30 (discussing Judge Judy); Michael M.
Epstein, Judging Judy, Mablean and Mills: How Courtroom Programs Use Law to Parade
Private Lives to Mass Audiences, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129 (2001).
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out in a fine article comparing Judge Judy" with The People's
Court,53 Judge Judy and the other current examples of the genre are
all about personality and not much at all about law:
[T]he official doctrine of the law recedes into the
background and the opinions, hunches, and intuition of
Judge Judy are pushed to the fore. There are no supporting
judicial actors on the program to provide complementary or
contrasting viewpoints on the disputes. There is no legal
analysis after each case .... Instead, this model of law
places Judge Judy at the very center of lawmaking,
moralizing judgments, and the delivery of justice. In this
television "reality," there are no other legal neighbors and
there is no other law than the law of Judge Judy. 4
The notion of law as guiding ideal, organizing framework, or
limiting principle is absent in these shows. Or perhaps it is more
accurate to say that law is affirmatively banished because the judge's
good old-fashioned straight-talking common sense is so obviously
superior. These shows focus on personality (and as Papke observes,
most of the judges are "over-the-top, authoritarian egomaniacs")."
Rather than explore the possible connections between personality
and legal interpretation, they convey the impression that personality
functions as a substitute for legal interpretation, and indeed, for law
itself. 6
What then of representations of the Supreme Court, where
momentous legal issues are debated, as any civics lesson should
teach? Here, too, the treatment of judges is disappointing. Even in
the wake of non-fiction treatments like The Brethren57 and Closed

52. Judge Judy (CBS television broadcast 1996-current).
53. The People's Court (Warner Bros. Television broadcast 198 1-current).
54. Kohm, supra note 51, at 703.
55. Papke, supra note 25, at 32.
56. Kohm argues that the older daytime courtroom shows, such as The People's Court,
embody a very different conception of law, one which emphasizes the importance of due process
as a guiding principle. Kohm, supra note 51, at 700-01. Generally he describes the judges in
these shows as hewing to the model of "unwitting conduit" for a set of laws which are viewed as
"inflexible neutral principles." Id. at 705-06. However, he notes that in The People's Court,
other courtroom actors and even people on the street are given their say about the judge's ruling.
Id. at 702. The ensuing dialogue, however, seems to establish that the law may be morally or
ethically ambiguous, rather than legally ambiguous. Id. at 702-03.
57. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979).
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Chambers58 (not to mention the debacle of Bush v. Gore59), the topic
of how Supreme Court justices discuss, negotiate, and reach
decisions has remained below the radar.6" Conflicts between justices
are portrayed as characterological rather than ideological. For
instance, as Laura Krugman Ray points out, First Monday in
October6' is essentially a romantic comedy about two bickering
opposites who find they are "a perfect match."62 In contrast, as she
notes, The Pelican Brief3 is interesting in that it portrays justices as
having ideological differences, albeit rather broad-brush differences
(e.g., protector of the environment versus enemy of the environment)
and albeit differences that are "subject to manipulation by sinister
external forces ...
64
Similarly, the television series First
65
Monday, though it depicts the Court deciding several controversial
issues, "portray[s] the Court as unabashedly political, suggesting...
that politics ... is the only relevant factor in the resolution of a
case." 66 Judgment at Nuremberg,6 7 although it depicts a judicial
struggle to determine the right course of action, deals with
momentous issues of positive versus natural law,68 rather than issues
of interpretation in situations in which the law is indeterminate, or, as
Judge Posner says, in the "open area."69
A counterexample-a situation in which conflicting
jurisprudential ideas are effectively dramatized-appears in The
People vs. Larry Flynt.7" Even on the heels of several courtroom

58.

EDWARD LAZARUS,

CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE

MODERN SUPREME COURT (1998).
59. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
60. Adam Burton, Pay No Attention to the Men Behind the Curtain: The Supreme Court,
PopularCulture, and the CountermajoritarianProblem, 73 UMKC L. REV. 53, 67 (2004).
61. FIRST MONDAY INOCTOBER (Paramount Pictures 1981).
62. Laura Krugman Ray, JudicialFictions: Images of Supreme Court Justices in the Novel,
Drama, and Film, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 188 (1997).
63. THE PELICAN BRIEF (Warner Bros. Pictures 1993).
64. Ray, supra note 62, at 197.
65. FIRST MONDAY (CBS Television 2002).
66. Burton, supra note 60, at 77.
67. JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (Roxlom Films Inc. 1961).
68. Moreover, as one discussion of the film argues, "the film looks at the role of judges in
enforcing laws ... [but provides] surprisingly little actual articulation [of the War Crimes Panel
Chairman's reasoning]." GREENFIELD, OSBORN & ROBSON, supra note 29, at 154.
69. Richard A. Posner, Foreword:A PoliticalCourt, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 40 (2005).
70. THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT (Columbia Pictures 1996).
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scenes involving Flynt engaging in colorfully outrageous behavior,
and (along with his lawyer) barely surviving a sniper attack outside
the courtroom, 71 the portrayal of the argument before the Supreme
Court in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. FalwelF2 holds its own as

gripping drama. This scene focuses on the argument by Flynt's
attorney, and features an active bench with several judges exploring
the scope and weight of competing constitutional values with
obvious difficulty.73 The scene effectively depicts the Court's
determination to focus on the abstract First Amendment issue,
despite distaste for the speaker, the magazine, and the content of the
speech (a depiction of Jerry Falwell having incest with his mother in
an outhouse).74
Nevertheless, the unanimous Supreme Court
decision is presented as vindicating the film's unambiguous
viewpoint that Flynt was entirely in the right.75 The nod to
interpretive leeway in the Supreme Court argument scene might be
better interpreted as a dramatic buildup toward the Court's discovery
of the correct legal answer.
In short, popular culture offers few models of judges honestly
grappling with difficult substantive legal issues in a context in which
more than one right answer is possible. It offers few examples of
political or ideological commitments, or even background and life
experience, as legitimate influences on legal interpretation. These
influences serve to label a judge "colorful": a kook, an eccentric, a
political hack, a manipulator, or a crook.76 And though we might
tolerate colorful characters in the movies or on television, we are
meant to understand that they are clearly an inappropriate influence
in the actual halls of justice, where, as Justice Alito assured the

71. Id.
72. 485 U.S. 46 (1988), rev'g Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
73. THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT, supra note 70. I owe thanks to Michael Asimow for
drawing this film, as well as REVERSAL OF FORTUNE (Sovereign Pictures et al. 1990), and
PENALTY PHASE (New World Television 1986), to my attention as films containing richer
portrayals of judges and the judicial role. See also Francis M. Nevins, Tony Richardson's The
[sic] Penalty Phase: Judging the Judge, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1557, 1580 (2001) (describing the
judge in Penalty Phase as facing a moral crisis over whether to destroy his career in a
"foredoomed attempt to save the life.., of a warped and violent white racist who...
demonstrably committed a cold-blooded and brutal murder").
74. THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT, supra note 70.
75. Id.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 36-56.
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Senate, "in every single case, the judge has to do what the law
requires.""
III. WHAT WE SHOULD TALK ABOUT
WHEN WE TALK ABOUT JUDGES

There are many pressing questions about the scope of the
judicial role that ought to be publicly discussed. Federal judges are
given life tenure and salary protection, yet are situated "within an
institution that is exposed and vulnerable to a wide array of controls
by the political branches."7 8 How much latitude should the political
branches have in shaping and guiding the judiciary-at the
confirmation stage, at the impeachment stage, and in between? To
what extent is it appropriate to evaluate judicial candidates by
reference to their political and ideological values? To what extent is
it appropriate for a judge to bring his political and ideological values
to bear in evaluating a case? Or, more accurately, is it possible to
decide a case without reference to such values? And what are the
costs of assuming these decisions are value-free and of failing to
inquire into candidates' ideological and political views? Politics, in
some sense of the term, will always play a role in judicial decisionmaking. That is inevitable. In some respects it is desirable; though
when it is desirable is precisely the question that should be debated.
The conventional discourse on these issues proceeds along two
tracks which are in direct, albeit unacknowledged, opposition. On
the one hand, the discourse proceeds as a high-minded fantasy of the
sort Judge Becker described: the judge newly born, a slate wiped
clean, a paragon of fairness unsullied by passion or politics.79 On the
other, it proceeds as a frank recognition of hardball partisan politics.
It is common for presidential candidates to promise to nominate
judges with certain ideologies, as President Bush promised to
nominate judges in the mold of Justices Scalia and Thomas.8" During

77. Alito ConfirmationHearing,supra note 2, at 56 (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.).
78. Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 977.
79. See Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 2, at 655-56 (statement of Edward R.
Becker, Senior J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third District).
80. See, e.g., David G. Savage, More than Just the Oval Office at Stake, LATIMES.COM, Oct.
2000,
http://edition.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/10/02/latimes.scotus/index.htm
2,
(noting that "Bush sa[id] he would choose new justices in the mold of Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas"). But see The Situation Room (CNN television broadcast Oct. 12, 2005),
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the Roberts confirmation hearings, amid accusations of political
activism on the bench, Senator Lindsey Graham said: "Elections
matter. The president won. He told us what he was going to do, and
he did it"-nominate a conservative to the court.8' How do these
discourses co-exist, and why isn't there more discussion about the
tension between them?
As Judge Posner observed, "[c]onstitutional cases ...

are aptly

regarded as 'political' because the Constitution is about politics and
because cases in the open area are not susceptible of confident
evaluation on the basis of professional legal norms.

82

To unpack

what is meant by "political" in this sentence, and then to discuss the
ways in which politics ought to shape constitutional interpretation,
requires an ongoing, nuanced, and careful discussion. Though
judges make value judgments, we hope they will not merely impose
their own preferences. But the distinctions between value judgments
and preferences are not bright-line differences.83 As I have argued
elsewhere, "[p]olitics, ideologies and theories of governance and
interpretation shade into one another."" For example, consider the
complex mix of political values reflected in the Erie85 opinion:
The goals Erie allowed [Justice Brandeis] to achieveimproving the social efficiency and practical fairness of the
system, and bringing the government into proper
constitutional balance-were dear to his heart and his
Progressive values. They were also fully consistent with
his vision of the Constitution, which was, in turn, deeply
intertwined with his emotional and political commitments.86
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0510/12/sitroom.02.html (asserting that Bush,
in fact, never made such a promise).
81. Savage, supra note 6 (quoting Sen. Lindsey Graham).
82. Posner, supra note 69, at 40 (referring to cases not directly controlled by precedent).
83. See Jeremy Waldron, How Judges Should Judge, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 10, 2006, at
58 (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE INROBES (2006)).
84. Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh, 56 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 947, 950 (2006) [hereinafter Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability]; see
also Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 882
(2001) [hereinafter Bandes, Erie] (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL

COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000)) (illustrating this point with the example of
Justice Brandeis and his opinion in the Erie case).
85. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
86. Bandes, Erie, supra note 84, at 882.
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Justice Brandeis can be judged partially by his craftsmanship-his
skill at drafting opinions, and his scrupulousness in use of
precedent-but ultimately, his measure as a judge will be taken in
light of his jurisprudence, and whether it advances "the values we
have chosen as a society. ' ' 7 The political discussion about, for
example, whether the jurisprudence espoused by Justices Scalia and
Thomas will advance salutary societal values and whether additional
judges should be appointed who share their jurisprudential
philosophy, is exactly the discussion a society devoted to the rule of
law ought to conduct.
The preceding paragraph used the term "politics" as a way of
looking at the world-a theory about the balance between
government and the governed and about the balance among
governmental branches. But the term "politics" can also refer, less
loftily, to the grubby realm of party politics. It would be fruitful to
explore the relation between political parties and judging: for
example the effect of politics on who gets to be a judge or the ways
in which party affiliation influences judicial conduct on the bench.
There is, increasingly, "striking evidence of a relationship between
the political party of the appointing president and judicial voting
Whether this bespeaks a tight fit between party
pattems." s
affiliation and jurisprudential philosophy, or suggests a loyalty or
even a sense of indebtedness on the part of the appointee is an
interesting question. Whether loyalty and indebtedness reflect a
kind of politics that should not shape judicial decisions is also
an interesting question, one that cannot be discussed without
first teasing apart the subtle variations subsumed under the term
''politics."
Bush v. Gore is an example of a judicial decision that was,
arguably, inappropriately political in every sense of the term
sketched above.89 First, it may have been an improper incursion by
the judiciary into the role of the political branches.9 ° Second, there
87. Id. at 883; see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 305 (2000).
88. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 147 (2006).
89. Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore,
82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 615-16 (2002).
90. Id. at 636-38.
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were many aspects of the case that suggested the decision violated
the rule of law in service to the lowest, least appropriate form of
politics-the desire to see a particular set of litigants, and indeed a
particular political party, win a particular case.9 1 And not just any
case but one determining which political party would rule the
country, and, along the way, appoint additional judges to the federal
courts (including the very court deciding the matter-the Supreme
Court itself).9 2
In short, terms like "politics" and "political"
encompass a range of conduct from broad ideological and
constitutional influences to decisions based solely on the identity of
the parties or the self-interest of the decision-maker. If we use the
word "political" too broadly and indiscriminately, we will not even
attempt to distinguish low or partisan politics from arguably more
legitimate political influences.
Moreover, to have a useful discussion about the role of the
judge, it would be helpful to distinguish state from federal court.93
The role of the state judiciary, which is not subject to Article III
constraints and protections, consists of both appointed and elected
judges, and is less often involved in federal constitutional
interpretation, raises a different set of concerns.94 Discussions of the
preference for judicial neutrality and the aversion to judicial activism
generally begin by considering the countermajoritarian difficulty."
The countermajoritarian difficulty (and I do not suggest that it is or
ought to be a difficulty, merely that it has for some time been
perceived as one)96 is said to arise from the fact that federal judges
are appointed, rather than elected. 7 Since the judicial branch is in
91. Id. at 645-46.
92. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Not as Bad as Plessy. Worse., in BUSH v. GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 20 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); Vincent Bugliosi, None Dare Call It
Treason, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 11; Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability, supra
note 84, at 959-60.
93. Such a discussion would have been quite germane and helpful, for example, in both the
Schiavo case and Bush v. Gore, since both concerned the scope of a state supreme court's power
to construe state law.
94. See, e.g., Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability, supra note 84, at 949-55;
Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About Electoralism: Rethinking Judicial Campaign Finance, 72
S. CAL. L. REv. 505, 512 (1999).
95. See Burton, supra note 60 (discussing the countermajoritarian difficulty and its effects
on portrayals of the U.S. Supreme Court).
96. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, PartFive, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002).
97. See id.
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this sense "undemocratic," or at least unaccountable (since federal
judges are granted life tenure), it ought not act as a "superlegislature" and impose its own preferences.98 State judges do not
have life tenure and are often elected.9 A nuanced discussion of the
constraints on state and federal judges ought to take note of this
difference.
It would also be useful to distinguish lower courts from the
United States Supreme Court, since concepts like adherence to the
rule of law and activism have very different meanings in the two
venues. The role of precedent in the Supreme Court is a topic that
tends to get aired in confirmation hearings, though not necessarily in
a way that conveys how much room there is to "adhere" to Roe v.
Wade, for example, while interpreting it in a variety of ways, or even
undercutting it.1"' A less obvious point is that interpretive leeway,
ambiguity, and ideology play a role not just on the high court but in
lower court decision-making as well. Indeed, even legal scholars
tend to underestimate the amount of discretion employed by lower
court judges.'' Lower courts often decide cases in which precedent
does not dictate a particular outcome. As Jeremy Waldron succinctly
put it, "[E]ven when he applies a precedent, the judge still has to
make value judgments of his own."'0 2 Moreover, in the majority of
cases, no reviewing court will determine definitively whether the
"wrong" decision was made.0 3 It is accurate to say, though, that
ambiguity and interpretive leeway play virtually no role in popular
representations of lower court decision-making.
In the degraded common discourse, none of these distinctions
can be made and none of these questions can be addressed because
98. Savage, supra note 6 (reporting that the Republicans on the Senate Judiciary Committee
complain that the Supreme Court has become a "super-legislature").
99. Bandes, Judging, Politics,and Accountability, supra note 84, at 5, 16.
100. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(reaffirming yet diluting the central holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); see also
Maura Reynolds, David G. Savage & Richard Simon, Alito Tells Skeptical Democrats He Would
Keep an Open Mind, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at Al; Confirmation Hearings on Federal
Appointments Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 55-75 (2003), excerpted in
Senators Pressed Roberts, Got Few Legal Opinions, CHI. TRIB., July 21, 2005, § 1, at 14;
Roundtable, Thomas on Trial: Did High Court Nominee Run from His Past or Tell It Like It Is?,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 22, 1991, at 93.
101. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 295-308
(2005).
102. Waldron, supra note 83, at 54.
103. Bandes, Judging,Politics, and Accountability, supra note 84, at 957-58.
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all of politics is placed in one basket and labeled unacceptable. This
coarse categorization creates a strong incentive to deny the role of
politics in judging. The result, as I will discuss later, is not to bar
politics from the bench, but to enshrine and insulate one particular
type of politics and ideology-the type that appears neutral, natural,
and apolitical. This is the most dangerous type of politics of all
because it not only claims pride of place, but declares itself invisible,
inevitable, and beyond the reach of democratic discourse.
IV.

WHY WAL-MART WON'T SELL JON STEWART'S BOOK

The missing elements both in the media portrayals of the judicial
role and in the popular discourse are ambiguity and complexity. As I
will argue later, these are distinctly liberal qualities and their absence
skews the discourse on the judicial role in a distinctly conservative
direction. This section explores several factors that account for the
failure of mainstream media to portray judges as complex characters
grappling with complex judicial issues. I suggest that the answer is
over-determined. The requisites of a number of genres converge.
These include the perceived expectations of film and television
audiences, the countermajoritarian difficulty and the concomitant
demands of the judicial voice, and, on the most basic level, deeply
rooted psychological preferences for certainty and narrative
cohesion.
One salient fact about judges in the media jumps out
immediately: media, as suggested above, rarely distinguish state
judges from federal; elected judges from appointed; judges who must
apply law handed down from a superior court from judges actually in
a position to make law."0 4 Most film and television judges are in trial
court, and they do mostly fact-finding (and the occasional inchambers scolding). The substantive legal issue they rule on most
often is guilt or innocence. In short, they are state criminal court trial
judges. Thus, the countermajoritarian difficulty would seem to have
little relevance to their conduct. It is more accurate to say that the
requisites of the genre demand that a "proper" judge should not
impose his preferences, period.
The more intractable problem arises from deep divisions about
what counts as "preference." This is the crux of the matter, of
104. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
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course. In order to have a real discussion about this issue, we would
need to unpack notions of ideology, politics, interpretation, and the
scope of judicial review. We would need to discuss the influences
that shape a judge's worldview-his life experiences, religious and
political commitments, empathies, antipathies, and blind spots We
would need to discuss the extent to which these are germane to
decision-making and the extent to which it is possible, or for that
matter desirable, to "rise above" them or "put them aside." We
would need to accept that there is no one right answer, no "rule" of
law that tells the judge how to do "what is required," and no such
thing as a judge who comes to the bench as a blank slate, ready and
able to decide every case "correctly." We would need to accept the
indeterminacy of the Constitution and other legal texts, and begin
from the premise that there is a range of reasonable or responsible
opinion about legal issues. This is a terrifying prospect. It is bad
enough that we've had to give up on the comforts of Father Knows
Best"°5 and Leave It to Beaver's16 Ward Cleaver. Do we really need
to give up the silver-haired omniscient judge as well?
As Richard Sherwin has written, we oscillate between two
extremes: "radical disenchantment (or 'skeptical postmodemism') on
the one hand and a reactionary nostalgia for Enlightenment
rationality and control on the other."' 7
There is little more
frightening than giving up on omniscience. The idea that this is not
an either/or choice, that the opposite of omniscience need not be
anarchy, is not only a threatening idea, but a sophisticated one. It
imposes a responsibility on the populace to debate and take seriously
questions about the nature of our legal institutions and the proper
scope and content of constitutional governance. As I will discuss
shortly, this is hardly a filmic or TV-friendly debate. But the
problem is no media creation.
Judges adopt the mantle of omniscience for a number of reasons.
First, judges may not realize that their perspective is partial or open
to question. The example of the "nine old men" of the Lochner court
illustrates this problem." 8 Sometimes judges hold beliefs that shape

105. FatherKnows Best, supra note 30.
106. Leave It to Beaver (CBS television broadcast 1957-1963).
107. SHERWIN, supra note 20, at 8.
108. See Bandes, Erie, supra note 84, at 857-58.
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their "most deeply held assumptions and first principles"'' 9 but that
do not appear to be beliefs at all. Rather, they seem neutral and
natural-just part of the way the world works. It has been argued
that the Lochner court was in precisely this position; its beliefs about
liberty of contract did not seem to qualify as ideological value
choices at all until the world began to change, exposing the beliefs as
contingent and contested."0
Whether or not judges understand that they are choosing among
options, they have strong reasons to couch their opinions as if no
such choice exists. I have elsewhere drawn on the work of Robert
Ferguson and Robert Cover to explore these reasons."' As Ferguson
argues, "the judicial opinion.., seeks to achieve the rhetoric of
inevitability, a rhetoric which admits of no freedom of choice on the
part of the judge."' 2 Cover explains:
[T]his rhetoric must give the impression "of bowing ... to
the inexorable force of crystal clear demands," so that
regardless of his decision in any case, the judge may
experience himself as a moral person who is simply bowing
to irresistible forces that transcend his own conscience or
sense of justice." 3
Thus, the decision to adopt this tone may be deeply ingrained or it
may be a pragmatic means of warding off cognitive dissonance or
accusations of partiality. As Ferguson explains, this formalist
approach is "not just a legal philosophy that can be put aside," but
"an innate psychological impulse," an integral part of the genre of
the legal opinion."' It is "a way to reassure the reader that [judges]
are rising above normal human predilections and that their
conclusions are compelled by logic;""' 5 as well as "to convince a
109. Id. at 858.
110. Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987);
Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1, 108 (1991).
111. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REv. 361,377-78 (1996).
112. Id. (quoting Robert A. Ferguson, The JudicialOpinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 201, 213-16 (1990)) (footnote omitted).
113.

Id. at 378 (quoting ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE

JUDICIAL PROCESS 233 (1975)).
114. Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
201, 208 (1990).
115. Bandes, Erie, supra note 84, at 868.
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democratic society
that independent judges work within the spirit of
' 16

justice for all."

Moreover, the judge without "human predilections" is a
synecdoche for a rule of law that operates in a purely cognitive
realm. Questions of character traits, preferences, perspectives, and
choices raise the specter of a rule of law overtaken by emotion. The
emotion/reason dichotomy has been central to law's most cherished
self-conception: a system that can be applied without human
fallibility.'17

In short, judges clothe themselves in the garb of inexorability,
and we like it that way. As a Wal-Mart spokeswoman said when the
Wal-Mart chain refused to sell Jon Stewart's America (the Book). 8
because it contained a photo of nine nude figures with the heads of
the Supreme Court justices pasted on them, "[A] majority of our
customers may not be comfortable with that image.""' Yet, if their
customers are representative, they, like a majority of Americans in a
recent poll, cannot name more than one Supreme Court justice. 2 °
Inexorability, infallibility, and invisibility go hand in hand. A judge
with defining features or strong character raises all the
uncomfortable questions about whether he has an "agenda." The
vaunted anonymity of the Supreme Court-our inability to watch the
justices deliberate on television, and-all but once or twice--even to
hear their voices over the radio, protects not only the dignity of the
office (or so it is claimed), but also the image of the omniscient
functionary: faceless, fungible, and fair.

116. Ferguson, supra note 114, at 208.
117. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 6-7 (Susan A. Bandes ed.,
1999).
118. AMERICA (THE BOOK): A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO DEMOCRACY INACTION (Jon Stewart et
al. eds., 2004).
119. Edward Wyatt, Banned in Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at E4 (quoting Karen
Burk).
120. They can, however, name two of Snow White's seven dwarfs. Zogby International,
New National Poll Finds: More Americans Know Snow White's Dwarfs Than Supreme Court
Judges, http://www.zogby.com/Soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=13498 (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
The Zogby poll also found that twice as many could identify the most recent winner of American
Idol, Taylor Hicks, as could identify the most recent justice confirmed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Samuel Alito. Id.
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V. THE BINARY SYSTEM

Either/or choices are attractive, even seductive: a government of
law versus a government of men; good versus evil; right versus
wrong; hero versus villain; reason versus emotion; neutrality versus
bias; the judge as potted plant versus the judge as super-legislator.
Ambiguity and indeterminacy make many people anxious. As
psychologist Jerome Kagan observed, there is a hardy preference for
stable essences and simple ideas.'21 The rule of law is a simple
idea-a stable essence-at least if we read out all the tensions
inherent in the concept. The tensions between consistency and
fairness, and between individual autonomy and the police power,
cannot be captured in simple, stable ideas. They require an ongoing
conversation about competing values.
Such conversations are
challenging under the best of circumstances. And these are not the
best of circumstances. In current times, we ought to be having a
deadly serious discussion about the function of the rule of law. For
example, does it require deference to the President's executive order
setting up military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, or does it
require that the commissions themselves adhere to norms of due
process?' 22 If the latter, are international norms relevant or binding,
or do we look solely to domestic precedent?'23 And is the answer one
that can evolve in light of changing circumstances, such as
increasingly serious threats to the safety of the country? Movies and
television have not proved to be the best of vehicles for exploring
these issues, so crucial to the shape of our democracy.
The visual mass media have, on the whole, flattened and
oversimplified complex legal issues such as the scope of the judicial
role. Yet it would be both simplistic and mistaken to claim that there
is something inherent in the media that leads to these flat character
portrayals and black or white treatments of issues. First of all, some
of the drive toward simplicity can be ascribed to the pull of deeply
rooted generic narrative conventions. The desire for a definitive
ending, a clear moral, and recognizable heroes and villains long
predates the advent of movies and television. There has always been
121. JEROME KAGAN, THREE SEDUCTIVE IDEAS 67 (1998) ("Three of the hardiest preferences
are for ideas that imply stable essences, possess symmetry, and are simple.").
122. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
123. See, e.g., Symposium: "OutsourcingAuthority?" Citation to Foreign Court Precedent
in Domestic Jurisprudence,69 ALB. L. REV. 645 (2006).
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a "deep and basic human need for narrative coherence ....Narrative
stabilizes, or appears to stabilize, a frighteningly complex world." '2 4
A well-formed, satisfying narrative tends to track the expectations of
the genre. 125 Therefore, as I have suggested, "[w]e can begin from
the assumption that narrative coherence is itself a conservative force,
by drawing on
in that it creates verisimilitude and a sense of2 meaning
6
expectations."'
narrative
familiar cultural and
Moreover, the expectations and limitations of the legal genre
may differ depending on the medium. For example, mainstream
television series need sympathetic characters who will keep viewers
tuning in.12 In contrast, film may have more room to challenge
viewer expectations.1 28 Thus, Naomi Mezey and Mark Niles found
that as to network television,
there are clear good guys, bad guys, and law usually works
pretty well .... In contrast ... [t]here are ...

a greater

percentage of films that allow for negotiated or oppositional
readings, readings that find the moral framework more
system more unreliable, more
ambiguous, and the legal
29
corrupt.
random, more
124. Bandes, Patterns of Injustice,supra note 36, at 1318.
125. Seeid. at 1310.
126. Susan Bandes, Running Away with the Circus: Untapping the Subversive Potential of
Civil Litigation'sNarratives, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 575, 581 (2000).
127. This is a dictate with which non-network television, notably HBO, has been playing in
interesting ways, for example in The Wire, Deadwood, and The Sopranos. Cartoons may also be
allowed more room for subversion. See, e.g., Kevin K. Ho, Comment, "The Simpsons " and the
Law: Revealing Truth and Justice to the Masses, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 275, 279 (2003).
128. However, a long running television series may have more room to develop a range of
characters, rather than, for example, one "prototypical" judge. Law & Order takes advantage of
this possibility, showing its prosecutors appearing before a number of different judges with
different approaches to law. Thus one author argues that
Law & Order episodes regularly discuss whether the judge's role is to interpret the law
as written or to make law by novel interpretations of statutes or establishing new
precedents... [and thus] the series is a good example of how legal fiction can provide
a better, more realistic, understanding of why judges are asked to, or are simply
tempted to, make laws, than many public affairs forums where the legitimacy of such
judicial law making is simply denied.
TIMOTHY 0. LENZ, CHANGING IMAGES OF LAW IN FILM & TELEVISION CRIME STORIES 29
(2003). Moreover, it may be possible for a long running show on network television to develop a
single judicial character who more realistically reflects the ambiguities of judging. Papke refers
to Judge Amy Gray in the series Judging Amy (CBS television broadcast 1999-2005) as a
"'rounded' judicial character." Papke, supra note 25, at 26. Both this show and Picket Fences
(CBS television broadcast 1992-1996) are beyond the scope of my current expertise.
129. Mezey & Niles, supra note 19, at 114.
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The question of expectations and limitations is itself complicated. In
the media context, these come from several sources, and the
perceived requisites of ratings, box office, and advertising loom
large. 3' As viewers, are we getting what we want, or, as Michael
Moore vividly suggested in Bowling for Columbine,' in sequences
both poignant 32 and hilarious,"' are we being insufficiently
challenged? Another source of limitation, as Mezey and Niles
discuss, was the infamous Hays Code, which was in force from 1934
to 1968 and which regulated not only on-screen kissing but also the
way in which law could be portrayed.'34 For example, it stated that
"[t]he courts of the land should not be presented as unjust.' ' 35 As the
authors note, "much of the content of contemporary popular
American film continues to fit the crude model of ideology
reinforcement that we associate with Hollywood film during the
'3 6

1
Hays Code and with the vast majority of network television.'
In short, it is tricky to discuss the requisites of media or
properties inherent in media.
There are pressures; there are
concerns; there are expectations; and sometimes there are even legal
limitations, but there is also choice. I was struck, for example, by

Pauline Kael's review of the 1962 film Billy Budd,'37 directed by

Peter Ustinov and starring Ustinov as Captain Vere, Terence Stamp
as Billy, and Robert Ryan as Claggart. 35 Kael liked the movie, but
she was troubled by Ustinov's direction and performance:
As Ustinov presents the film, the conflict is between the
almost abstract forces of good (Billy) and evil (Claggart)
130. See id. at 167-70. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider the commercial
considerations (for example, the increasing consolidation of media outlets) that drive decisionmaking as to what gets produced, aired, and marketed.
131. BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE (Dog Eat Dog Films et al. 2002).
132. Moore included a moving and eye opening sequence about a little boy in Flint,
Michigan, who shot another child. See id. He showed why his mother was not at home
supervising her child, examining both what she needed to do under welfare-to-work policies and
the dearth of affordable day care for her child while she was working. See id.
133. Moore filmed a comic sequence designed as a riff on shows like COPS (Fox Network
television broadcast 1989-current), which tend to show young black males being forcefully
subdued after allegedly committing violent crimes. See BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE, supra note
13 1. His sequence depicted the arrest of a white collar criminal. See id.
134. Mezey & Niles, supra note 19, at 135-37.
135. Id. at 136.
136. Id. at 139.
137. BILLY BUDD (Anglo-Allied Pictures et al. 1962).
138. PAULINE KAEL, Billy Budd, in I LOST IT AT THE MOVIES 234, 234-39 (1965).

Winter 2007]

WE LOST IT AT THE MOVIES

with the Captain a human figure tragically torn by the rules
and demands of authority. Obviously. But what gives the
story its fascination, its greatness, is the ambivalent
Captain ....Vere is the evil we can't detect: the man
whose motives and conflicts we can't fathom. Claggart we
can spot, but ... it is the Captain, Billy's friend, who

continues the logic by which saints must be destroyed.'39
Kael saw no reason why Captain Vere could not have been portrayed
as a more ambiguous character. 4 ° She noted that in the novella,
there was a question about his soundness of mind, and there were
concerns about his motivations for the unseemly haste with which he
ordered Billy executed.' 4 ' This was not a story about a casualty of
justice, but about the nature of justice and the nature of the human
beings who must administer it, sometimes in terrible
circumstances.'42 Kael wished the movie told this more complex,
important, and affecting story-the story she believed Melville was
trying to tell.' 43 To her, there was nothing inherent in the medium to
prevent this; it was merely an issue of how the director and actors
interpreted the text.'" Of course, the movie and the review are more
than forty years old;' 45 perhaps our tolerance for complexity has
diminished since then.
All caveats aside, however, there are certain characteristics of
modern American media that pose hurdles to complex treatment of
judges and judging. Jeffrey Scheuer's The Sound Bite Society'46
examines many of these hurdles. Although it does so primarily in
the context of television, much of its analysis is generally applicable
to audio-visual media, which, as Todd Gitlin says, "share a texture"
and come together in a "torrent [that] is seamless."' 4 7 As Scheuer

explains, the "grammar" of television is driven by both technological
and commercial considerations, and it is difficult to separate the
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 236-37.
See id. at 236.
Id. at 236-37.
See id. at 239.
Id. at 238-39.
Id.
Id. at 234.
SCHEUER, supra note 42.

147.

TODD GITLIN, MEDIA UNLIMITED: HOW THE TORRENT OF IMAGES AND SOUNDS

OVERWHELMS OUR LIVES 7 (2001).
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two. 148 He argues that a central characteristic of television is its
abhorrence of boredom, confusion, and stasis. 149 "[It] has a deep
structural bias toward appearances and concreteness-immediacy in
time and space-and against generality or abstraction."' 5 0 This bias
renders substance much easier to depict than process: the image of a
judge wrongly depriving Terri Schiavo of sustenance is much easier
to depict, for example, than the image of a judge properly deferring
to the language and intent of a statute or the credibility determination
of a lower court. Television resists complex messages, "militat[ing]
against a vision that emphasizes ...abstraction, . . . ambiguity and
nonbinary thinking."' 5 ' It "rewards simpler messages," '52 emphasizing individuals rather than structures, groups, or social movements, and stock characters rather than complex, ambiguous ones."'
Thus, its preference is for sharply delineated heroes and villains
engaging in dramatic conflicts that can be visually depicted in simple
terms and definitely resolved. It has an aversion to "root causes and
long-term effects, context and environmental factors, abstract ideas
or arguments, generalities [or] evolutionary change."' 54
These preferences present serious obstacles to the creation of
complex portraits of judges and judging. The media thrive on conflict, and the simplest conflicts to depict are those between the good
judge and the bad judge or the right decision and the wrong decision
(on the merits). As it happens, many interest groups thrive on
precisely the same sort of conflict: they arouse passion by decrying
particular decisions on the merits, irrespective of precedent, process,
or other rule of law values. What gets lost is the depiction of men
and women deliberating in good faith on complex social issues that
have no definitive answers but afford a spectrum of reasonable
approaches. Indeed, the very notion of deliberating is part of the
problem: sitting on a bench and thinking just isn't very filmic. What
also gets lost is the notion that judges are human and that, though

148. SCHEUER, supra note 42, at 68.
149. Id. Gitlin makes precisely the same point about films. See GITLIN, supra note 147, at
71-117.
150. SCHEUER, supra note 42, at 73.
151. Id. at9-10.
152. Id. at 34.
153. See id. at 75.
154. Id. at 74.
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frightening, this is also unavoidable and even desirable. We don't
really want an army of Ward Cleaver clones deciding every case.
VI. PAYING ATTENTION TO THE MAN BEHIND THE CURTAIN

The crucial point underlying this discussion of judging is that
these media conventions, and the portrayals they spawn, are not
value-neutral. Even the invisible iconic judge-the baseline against
whom all other judges are judged-has both defining characteristics
and a judicial philosophy. But these are so deeply ingrained, and so
thoroughly taken for granted, that they simply go without saying.'55
The demographic norm is a white male norm, and deviations from
that norm appear just that-deviant. The judge appears neutral to the
extent he exhibits no characteristics that depart from this norm.
Noticeable emotion, an instinctive empathy or lack of empathy
toward particular litigants, reference to one's background influences
and their effect on the decisional process,156 or the acknowledgment
of ambiguity or uncertainty are examples of characteristics that
would set the judge apart from the norm. As I have argued, judges
exhibiting such characteristics tend to be dismissed, marginalized,
demonized, or otherwise tagged as defective.'57
When the judicial role is portrayed as divided into two starkly
different camps-the invisible placeholder for the rule of law and the
injudicious character-both sides of the divide play an essential role.
The latter role-emotional, partial, noticeable, corrupt, or criminalreaffirms for us what the good judge is not. As Patricia Ewick and
Susan Silbey have so eloquently argued, the subversive shores up the
155. Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2308-09
(1990) [hereinafter Bandes, The Negative Constitution].
156. However, recent confirmation hearings provide dramatic examples of a twist on this
generic expectation: the conservative judge who offers his humble background as assuranceimplicit or explicit-that he is more compassionate than he might seem. Clarence Thomas, for
example, invoked his boyhood in a tenement in segregated Pin Point, Georgia, and the advice he
received from one early mentor to "just along the way, help someone who is in your position."
Ronald Taylor, Nominee Invokes His Humble Beginnings, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at A1;
see also Fred Barbash, Thomas Molds Hearing to Play Up His Heritage; Tactic Holds Off Tough
Scrutiny of His Record, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11, 1991, at Al; Lee May, Hometown Support Is
Rock-Solid: Nominee Seen as a Hero Wronged, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at A6. Similarly,
Samuel Alito, whose record raised concerns that he had little empathy for workers, the poor, or
other less than powerful groups, talked about his Italian immigrant father who grew up in
poverty, and his own upbringing in "an unpretentious, down-to-earth community." Jonathan
Zimmerman, Alito's Mythical Feel-Good America, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006, at B17 (quoting
Alito); see also Jeffrey Rosen, JudicialExposure,N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., Jan. 29, 2006, at 27.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 40-50.
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hegemonic' 58 The traditional, "ideal" conception of the rule of law,
in which "the law attends to what is general and universal" and is
"animated by aspiration for disinterested decision making and
impersonal treatment,' '" 5 is so obviously contradicted by the frequent
behavior of actual judicial actors that it could not be sustained if it
were the only story available. 6 ° Thus, it works in tandem with the
conception of law as "a pragmatic, perhaps vulgar, account of the
routine practices of biased, differentially endowed, and fallible
actors.''
These parallel discourses work together to preserve the
status quo by picturing departures from the idealized version as
isolated and particularized. As Ewick and Silbey put it:
[F]irsthand evidence and experience that might potentially
contradict [the] general truth is excluded as largely
irrelevant.
By effacing the connections between the
concrete particular and the transcendent general, hegemonic
ideologies conceal social organization. As a consequence,
power and privilege are preserved through what appears to
be the irreconcilability of the particular and the general.'62
If the neutral judge is one who sees the legal world as simple
and determinate, then not only the vulgar, comic, or corrupt judge,
but any judge who doesn't fit the mold, is acting improperly. Thus
the judge who acknowledges complexity, indeterminacy, and
perspective is branded as non-neutral or ideological. Indeed, the
fiction of the neutral judge helps elide the contradiction, discussed
earlier, between "judge as blank slate" and "judge as spoils of the
election." If a reference to judges in the mold of Justices Scalia and
Thomas is used and understood as code for "judges who will simply
apply the law as written and not impose their own preferences," then
it becomes a non-ideological act to appoint people sharing this
philosophy. Under this understanding, appointing judges like Roberts and Alito is not a political act because their jurisprudence is not
a philosophy at all; it is simply proper, unmarked, unbiased judging.

158.

See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM

EVERYDAY LIFE 226-27 (1998).
159. Id. (what they call "before the law").
160. See id.
161. Id. at 227 (what they call "with the law").
162. Id. at231.
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But, as Jeffrey Scheuer puts it, "how complex a world one
chooses to see ...

is a quintessentially ideological decision."' 63 In

other words, the preference for a simple, black-and-white worldview
is itself an ideological preference.
Dangerously-and with a
powerful assist from popular culture-this preference becomes
normalized. Alternative approaches become tainted. The worldview
that encompasses abstract notions like systemic causes and collective
harms and rights, rather than merely concrete constructs like
individual autonomy and simple causal chains, is liberal in nature. It
permits a more expansive view of governmental or corporate
accountability, since wrongdoing by entities is often causally
complex.'64 It makes it more likely that those challenging the status
quo will gain access to the courts, since plaintiffs seeking to
challenge entrenched interests may assert shared or intangible
"' It permits an expanded view of government liability,
harm. 65
since it
does not demand that rights and duties conform to those recognized
66
under the common law.

Likewise, the judicial philosophy that accepts ambiguity and
indeterminacy and admits to the possibility of a broad range of good
faith opinion is essentially liberal in nature. And that philosophy is
then placed in the basket of "ideological, political, activist" judging,
and compared, to its great disadvantage, to the ideology-free, valueneutral judging that supposedly characterizes those who describe
themselves as textualists. In this view, an ideological judge is one
who is open to claims that challenge the status quo, and the claims
themselves (e.g., civil rights claims) are repackaged as special
interest pleadings, class warfare, or ideological posturing. And thus,
when Justice Alito was asked his views on civil rights and other
aspects of his jurisprudential philosophy, he and his defenders argued
that it would be wrong for him to answer.'67 They depicted the
questions as demands to engage in low politics or to make unsavory
promises to take care of special interests. 68 Senator Hatch argued
163. SCHEUER, supra note 42, at 16.
164. See Susan Bandes, Not Enough Blame to Go Around: Reflections on Requiring
PurposefulGovernment Conduct, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1197-98 (2003).
165. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 250-58 (1990).
166. See Bandes, The Negative Constitution, supra note 155, at 2291-93.
167. See Savage, supra note 6.
168. See id.
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'
that the Senate should apply "a judicial, not a political, standard."169
Senator Brownback railed against the idea that "spots on the
Supreme Court [are] reserved for certain ideologies ... causes or
interests." ' And Justice Alito explained that a judge cannot have an
agenda, only a "solemn obligation" to the rule of law.' 7'
In short, the very idea of a jurisprudential philosophy is
positioned as an activist idea-a deviation from the norm. The effect
in the Alito and Roberts confirmation hearings was to privilege,
normalize, and insulate a particular jurisprudential philosophy-one
that sees protection of civil rights as an agenda and one that rejects
viewpoint epistemology, ambiguity, or the evolution of legal thought
as ideological. And an additional irony-or bonus, depending on
where one stands-is that an essential part of this normalized
ideology is its very rejection of the idea of keeping an open mind.
As Justice Thomas once proudly declared, "I'm not evolving.""2' '
And thus, putting such a judge on the bench may be, for his
supporters, a gift that keeps on giving.'73
In these ways, the popular culture feedback loop poses a real
threat to the Court's countermajoritarian function, and to perceptions
of law's legitimacy in general. In the popular version of the
American judicial system, both on the big and small screen and in
the wider theater of governmental and public debate, protection of
entrenched interests and dominant ideologies is equated with the rule
of law. And the very act of raising alternative conceptions of the role
of the courts is marked as ideological and agenda-driven. Alternative voices exist, both in the public discourse and, occasionally, in
the movies and on television. It is just very difficult to hear them.
As lawyers and legal academics, we have something important
to contribute, and even a chance of being heard. Although there is
much to debate about the proper scope of judging, there are some
notions to which no serious lawyer subscribes. One is that all any
judge has to do, in any case, is simply "what the law requires."
169. Charles Babington & Amy Goldstein, Alito on Day 1: 'A Judge Can't Have Any
Agenda': Court Nominee to Be Questioned by Senators Today, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at
Al.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Clarence Page, Extending an Olive Branch (with Pits) to Justice Thomas, CHI. TRIB.,
June 3, 1998, at 19 (quoting a remark Justice Thomas is said to have made in his chambers).
173. See SUNSTEIN, SCHKADE, ELLMAN & SAWICKI, supra note 88, at 247.
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There are reasons why some of those who know better are willing to
perpetuate this caricature, but no good reasons-at least none that are
worth the costs. This is theater with consequences, and it is our
obligation to play a larger role.
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